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Abstract
I show that in a setting with costly information processing, strategic complementarity in pricing,
by generating planning complementatrities, results in the aggregate price responding slowly to nom-
inal shocks even though individual firm prices change by large amounts in response to idiosyncratic
shocks. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) conclude that none of the commonly used pricing models
is capable of matching all the facts from micro data and at the same time generate a large and
persistent response to monetary policy. Unlike the standard state dependent pricing models which
rely on physical costs of changing prices to generate unresponsiveness of prices, I instead focus on
costs of planning and processing information, a channel which researchers have found empirically
more important than physical costs of changing prices in determining pricing decisions of firms.
The model is able to match all the features of micro pricing data and at the same time generates a
sluggish response of aggregate price to monetary policy, thus predicting a short run Phillips curve.
Also, the model generates firms behavior in which they set price plans rather than prices and also
shows that firms may choose to index prices to long run inflation optimally as is often assumed in
New-Keynesian models. The paper highlights the fact that to explain non-neutrality in the short
run, prices need not be sticky, it is just that they do not contain all the information in the short
run but become informationally efficient in the long run resulting in a long run neutrality result.
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1 Introduction
One of the oldest questions in macroeconomic theory is whether nominal rigidities are important.
Prices and wages do not immediately adjust proportionally in the short run to changes in nominal
expenditures and hence the issue of why prices are sticky (or if they are sticky at all) has been a
hugely debated issue. A vast theoretical literature tries to explain the existence of sticky prices.
Sticky prices are given so much importance because it is believed that the monetary transmission
mechanism operates through aggregate price not responding fully and immediately to increases in
money supply, thus creating increased economic activity in the short run. Much recent research has
studied the frequency of price changes and whether sticky prices are important for the dynamics of
output.
The answer to whether sticky prices is the correct channel through which monetary policy has real
effects in the short run, is not very clear. Recent microeconomic pricing studies such as Bils and Klenow
(2004) show that the median non-housing consumer price changes at a frequency less than once every
4.3 months. This is slightly more than a quarter and suggests that prices are not very sticky. Further
micro level pricing evidence from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) shows that conditional on a price
change, the size of a price change is large in absolute terms, at about 13 percent if one includes sales
or 8.5 percent if sales are removed. Thus, micro level pricing behavior does not support the sticky price
story. However, many studies at the macro level do support a role for sticky prices in the monetary
transmission mechanism. As Christiano et al. (1999) point out, while many different identification
schemes have been used to identify monetary policy shocks, there is considerable agreement over the
qualitative effects of a monetary policy shock:
“The nature of this agreement is as follows: after a contractionary monetary policy shock,
short term interest rates rise, aggregate output, employment, profits and various mone-
tary aggregates fall, the aggregate price level responds very slowly, and various measures
of wages fall, albeit by very modest amounts.” - pg 7,Christiano et al. (1999)
Other research, such as Uhlig (2005), provides evidence of sluggish adjustment of aggregate prices.
According to Uhlig (2005), only about 25 percent of the long-run response of the U.S. GDP price
deflator to a monetary policy shock occurs within the first year after the shock, hence indicating a
sluggish response of aggregate prices to monetary policy shocks.
Existing standard models in macroeconomics cannot match both macro and micro facts convinc-
ingly. The standard time dependent, in the tradition of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) can explain the
sluggish price level only if firms change prices infrequently and by small amounts. These requirements
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are not satisfied in micro data as documented above. The other popular alternative is the state depen-
dent menu cost models such as Dotsey et al. (1999) and more recently Midrigan (2008) and Golosov
and Lucas (2007). Golosov and Lucas (2007) calibrated using micro pricing data, find that monetary
shocks do not induce large or persistent real responses. Thus, standard macroeconomic models of
pricing behavior are incapable of matching simultaneously both micro and macro facts from the data.
Less than a handful of new research is able to account for volatile prices at the firm level and at the
same time sluggish aggregate price so that the sticky price hypothesis has some bite and at the same
time the micro level pricing evidence is satisfied.
In this paper, I explore the idea that price stickiness is due to informational constraints for a
firm and show that in a setting where there is imperfect information, firms will optimally choose not
to change prices fully in response to aggregate shocks such as monetary expansions. This makes the
response of aggregate prices to aggregate shocks sluggish and this results in in a hump shaped response
of real aggregate output. The idea that monetary policy is non-neutral in the short to medium run
due to imperfect information is not new and goes as far back as Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1973).
Lucas (1973) suggests that lack of information about monetary policy shocks explains why prices are
slow to adjust their prices to these shocks. A common criticism of Lucas (1973) is that news about
monetary policy shocks is available with little delay, and so the Lucas model cannot explain persistent
real effects of monetary policy shocks. Thus, an explanation was required why firms choose not to
observe publicly available information. Recent work following Sims (1998) introduces the concept
of Rational Inattention to incorporate agents with limited information processing capabilities into
standard models. Because these agents have a limited information processing capacity, they rationally
ignore some information that is publicly available. This idea has been extended in work by Woodford
(2002), who presents a model in which strategic complementarity in price setting can generate large
and persistent real effects of a nominal shock. Recently, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) show that
it is optimal for agents to pay less attention to aggregate shocks than to idiosyncratic shocks and
use this mechanism to explain why prices at the micro level may be volatile even while aggregate
prices respond sluggishly to nominal aggregate demand shocks resulting in real effects on output. This
paper adopts the approach in which the firm does not know the true realization of the monetary
shock because it chooses not to observe it rather than assuming that firms do not have access to this
information.
Another branch of literature which invokes imperfect information to explain the behavior of prices
is the sticky information literature (Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2007)), which builds on an idea
similar to Calvo (1983) by assuming that only a fraction of firms get perfect information every period.
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As a result of this sticky information, only a fraction of firms have full information when making their
pricing decision and this results in prices adjusting slowly to shocks. However, this literature cannot
explain differential price adjustment to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
The idea that the explanation for the slow response of prices to nominal shocks lying in information
has a lot of support. As Radner (1992) points out, a large proportion of the workforce employed in
American firms is employed for the purpose of information processing. Also, direct support that
firms do not change prices due to the costs of processing information continuously can be seen in the
work by Zbaracki et al. (2004). The authors identify and measure three types of managerial costs:
information gathering, decision making and communication costs and find that the managerial costs
are quantitatively much more important than physical costs of changing prices. These facts suggest
that menu cost models attribute a misplaced importance to the physical costs of changing prices and
ignore the more important costs related to gathering and processing information to come up with
new prices. In this paper I formally try to incorporate this idea that firms have to incur a cost to
acquire and process information to come up with a new price. To capture this idea, I assume that
each firm faces a fixed cost if they decide to plan. Thus, the model can be thought of as providing
micro foundations to the menu costs model. By possibly being able to fit data better than standard
menu cost models such as Golosov and Lucas (2007), who find that on calibrating the model to match
the micro pricing facts, the model predicts a small and transitory response to monetary shocks, this
model suggests that the current state dependent models might be looking at the wrong place for costs
of changing prices.
This paper builds on all the above mentioned literature and can be thought of being closest to
the sticky information1 augmented with strategic motives in acquiring information. The combination
of endogenous information choice with strategic complementarity in pricing results in strategic com-
plementarity in information acquisition (Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009)) and I exploit this feature to
be able to not only generate a smaller response in magnitude of the price change to the same size of
the aggregate monetary shock as compared to an idiosyncratic shock. In addition I am able to also
endogenize to a certain extent the frequency of price changes: firms optimally choose to incorporate
information about the aggregate shock into prices less often than they incorporate idiosyncratic shocks
into prices and hence, aggregate price move in a sluggish manner. Thus, the model generates a short
run Phillips curve allowing for inflation in the short run to result in higher economic activity but no
1Most of the sticky information literature does not model information choice endogenously. Reis (2007) is an exception
which models the information choice endogenously and shows that this constitutes a micro-foundation to the usual sticky
information arrival assumption.
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such trade-off in the long run.
The main mechanism through which I am able to explain a differential adjustment of price changes,
both in terms of magnitude and frequency, in response to aggregate nominal and idiosyncratic shocks
is that there is a strategic complementarity associated in acquiring information about the aggregate
state but not so about the idiosyncratic state. When a firm i gets new information about a positive
nominal aggregate shock, its response in terms of a price change is not only dependent on the true
aggregate state, it is also depend on how other firms react to the nominal aggregate shock. If other
firms do not adjust their price then it is not be optimal for firm i to do so as increasing the price
would actually make its price above the price of the others and hence this results in a loss in profits
due to loss in demand. This can be seen in terms of the fact that the monetary shock is a public signal
and so on observing a public signal entails not just determining how to respond to this information
but also how other are going to respond to it. This is exactly what distinguishes a firms response to
an idiosyncratic shock. Information about the firm’s own idiosyncratic state is a private signal and so
since no one else observes it, the firms only needs to concentrate on how to respond to it individually
and not worry about how other respond to it. I solve for a staggered equilibrium2, i.e. one in which all
firms optimally choose not to update their information at the same time. At each instant only a fixed
fraction of firms choose to update their information sets. In such a staggered setting, a new aggregate
shock is not observed by all firms when it occurs and hence the firms that do observe it are forced to
temper their price change to incorporate the fact that a large fraction of firms is still uninformed about
this shock and their prices will not respond to this. This results in less than proportional increases
in price on impact of the monetary shock. Prices catch up eventually when every one updates their
information sets and is informed about the shock. On the other hand, an idiosyncratic shock is met
by a proportional change as the response of others to a shock that they don’t observe is not a concern,
and so even by changing prices in response to idiosyncratic shocks is not going to move it way out
of line with the average price. The frequency aspect can be thought of in the same way; firms can
delay their decision to update their information about the aggregate state because at any instant a
large fraction of firms is uninformed about the true aggregate state and hence the private loss from
being uninformed is not big. This motive is not present in the case of updating in formation about the
idiosyncratic state as the loss from being uninformed about the idiosyncratic state does not depend
on how well informed others are about it. Thus, firms tend to update their information about the
idiosyncratic state more often than about the aggregate state and hence, prices of firms incorporate
new information about the idiosyncratic shock more often. This allows prices to change frequently
2I discuss the possibility of other equilibria in the following section.
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and because information about the aggregate shock is incorporated slowly into prices, the response of
prices to nominal shocks can be sluggish. The reason why firms do not update their information sets
at all times is because of the non-convex costs of updating the information set. This, as in the large
literature on menu costs, results in firms only updating their information infrequently.
The model presented in this paper is one of the few which can reconcile the seemingly contradictory
macro and micro level pricing evidence. The model predicts the presence of a trade-off between inflation
and output in the short run but not in the long run, hence it predicts a perfectly vertical Long Run
Phillips Curve but not short run Phillips curve which is not perfectly vertical. To the extent of my
knowledge, this is one of the few papers which tries to endogenously model the frequency of price
changes. The model is consistent with evidence from various studies. By allowing for frequently
changing and volatile prices it matches evidence presented in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008). At the same time, by being able to generate a sluggish response of aggregate
price to monetary shocks, it is in good standing with a large macro literature which claims that the
sluggish response of prices in the short run results in real effects of monetary shocks in the short run.
The relevance of this literature had come into question with the micro level pricing evidence which
suggested that prices were volatile and changed frequently. In addition, the mechanism presented
in this paper, unlike other papers such as Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), does not require that
idiosyncratic shock are relatively more volatile than aggregate shocks. In fact, I show that, even if the
cost of planning for and the volatility of the aggregate and idiosyncratic states is the same, firms will
optimally choose to update their information set about the idiosyncratic shock more often and hence,
prices will reflect new information about the idiosyncratic shock more frequently and hence change
frequently in response to idiosyncratic shocks but respond sluggishly to monetary policy shocks.
Standard New Keynesian macro models which model price stickiness using time dependent models
such as Gertler and Gali (1999) often assume that the non-adjusting firms prices are indexed to
lagged or average inflation. Kryvtsov and Kichian (2008) state that adding these features is motivated
by methodological convenience as the model then fits the data better. This paper provides micro
foundations for such an assumption. In Section 4, I show that when the average long run inflation
is positive, the firms that are not updating their information set, choose to endogenously index their
price to this long run inflation.
Also, this paper is capable of matching some important regularities seen in price data as laid out
in Mankiw and Reis (2010). Mankiw and Reis (2010) state that a few facts from data stand out: that
firms change prices all the time, firms set price schedules over time rather than prices at each instant
and sometimes theses schedules are flat. This paper is able to capture all these aspects. The paper
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is also consistent to a certain extent with studies such as Blinder et al. (1998) and Zbaracki et al.
(2004) who used interviews with firm managers to determine what the reasons were for firms pricing
behavior. Blinder et al. (1998) find evidence that suggests that managers set price plans rather than
attempt to determine the optimal price at each instant. Extensions of the basic setup are capable
of accounting for firms setting price plans over time rather than prices at an instant. This is similar
to Burstein (2006) except that this paper does not have to rely on physical costs of changing price
schedules like that paper.
This paper is a full dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in the sticky information tradition
and follows others like Mankiw and Reis (2006) and Mankiw and Reis (2007). Also, unlike previous
attempts to incorporate sticky information into a DSGE setting as in Knotek-II (2006), I do not
assume that firms face a cost in changing prices. In the basic model presented, firms can change prices
at any instant but choose not to do so optimally. The paper is arranged as follows. In the next section,
I present the basic model which allows me to derive closed form or analytical solutions for most of the
results. In section 3, I discuss the results from the previous section. In section 4, I use some other
specifications to make some additional points. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
The model combines features from Golosov and Lucas (2007), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and
Reis (2007). Time is continuous3. At each instant, the economy consists of continuum of identical
consumers and a unit mass of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] which produce
differentiated goods. Each of the households are infinitely lived and consume goods produced by each
monopolistically competitive firm. I do not model entry or exit of firms and hence, the mass of firms
remains constant over time.
The economy is subject to two kinds of shocks: a monetary shock and a firm specific idiosyncratic
shock. The log of nominal money supply is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift µ and
variance σ2m.
d lnM(t) = µdt+ σmdW (t) (1)
where W (t) is a standard Brownian motion.
3The use of continuous time is only to avoid a integer problem in the choice of the optimal planning horizons which
enables one to find unique planning horizons. A working paper of Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) shows how a discrete
time setup may result in multiple equilibria. The use of continuous time helps one get a unique staggered equilibrium.
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Firm specific productivity shocks Zi(t) are assumed to be independent and identical across firms
and follows the mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck4 process with 0 drift, η the rate of mean reversion
and variance σ2z as in Golosov and Lucas (2007).
d lnZi(t) = −η lnZi(t)dt+ σzBi(t) (2)
where Bi(t) is a standard Brownian motion such that for j 6= j′, Bj and Bj′ are independent and also
Bj is independent of W , ∀j ∈ [0, 1].5
2.1 Representative Household’s Problem
Each consumer enjoys utility from consumption of a final good, leisure and from holding real balances.
I introduce the dis-utility from labor entering the utility in a linear fashion as in Hansen (1985).The
representative household’s problem can be written as choosing the sequence
{
C(t), n(t), M
D(t)
P (t)
}∞
t=0
to
maximize
E0
{∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
C(t)1−γ
1− γ − αn(t) + ln
(
MD(t)
P (t)
)]
dt
}
subject to its budget constraint
M(0) ≥ E0
{∫ ∞
0
Q(t)[P (t)c(t) +R(t)MD(t)− ω(t)n(t)−Π(t)]dt
}
(3)
where Q(t) is the shadow price of nominal cash flows, Π(t) the nominal profits from firms and lump
sum transfers. R(t) is the nominal interest rate and satisfies the following
Q(t) = eR(t)dtEt{Q(t+ dt)}
Also, C(t) is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator
C(t) =
[∫ 1
0
ci(t)
−1
 di
] 
−1
which aggregates consumption of a continuum of goods indexed i ∈ [0, 1], each produced by one of the
continuum of monopolistically competitive firms which operate in the market.
The first-order conditions with respect to C(t), n(t) and MD(t) can be written as
e−ρtC(t)−γ = λQ(t)P (t) (4)
e−ρtα = λQ(t)ω(t) (5)
e−ρt
1
MD(t)
= λQ(t)R(t) (6)
4η ≥ 0 is the rate of mean reversion and so for η = 0, the process is a Brownian motion with 0 drift and variance σ2z .
5Earlier work such as Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) argue for the need of an idiosyncratic
shock to be able to match the characteristics of price changes seen in firm level pricing data.
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where λ is the multiplier on (3) and is independent of time. Equations (5) and (6) imply the following
relationship between equilibrium the wage rate ω(t) and money supply M(t):
ω(t) = αR(t)M(t) (7)
Thus, lnω(t) is also a Brownian motion with variance σ2m. Also, equations (4) and (6) imply that the
level of consumption each period is given by
C(t) =
(
R(t)M(t)
P (t)
) 1
γ
(8)
Given (8), the demand for the i-th consumption good an be written as:
ci(t) = C(t)
(
Pi(t)
P (t)
)−
(9)
where
P (t) =
[∫ 1
0
Pi(t)1−di
] 1
1−
(10)
It is shown in Appendix A.1 that an equilibrium with a constant nominal interest rate exists. In
equilibrium, the constant nominal interest rate is given by
R(t) = ρ+ µ− σ
2
m
2
,∀t (11)
2.2 Firm’s Problem
Each monopolistically firm i’s production technology can be described by a decreasing returns to scale
production function
yi(t) = AZi(t)Li(t)θ (12)
where A > 0 is a constant and θ ∈ (0, 1]. Zi(t) is the firm specific idiosyncratic productivity shock and
Li(t) is the amount of labor the firm hires labor in an economy-wide labor market from households at
a wage rate ω(t) at date t. Firm i’s nominal profit at date t can be written as
pii(t) = Pi(t)Ci(t)− ω(t)L(t)i = Pi(t)Ci(t)− ω(t)
(
Ci(t)
AZi(t)
) 1
θ
Zbaracki et al. (2004) find that costs of acquiring information and planning to incorporate this infor-
mation into the pricing decision are very important in a firms decision not to change prices often. The
authors find that such costs are quite large and quantitatively more important than the physical costs
associated with changing prices, and thus, have an impact on the frequency with which firms change
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their prices. To capture this idea, I assume that each firm faces a fixed labor cost Fm , if they decide
to “plan” about the aggregate state/monetary shock and Fz if they “plan” about their idiosyncratic
state. The firm then chooses its process of prices {Pi(t)}∞t=0, and a process of planning dates Dai (t),
where dDai (t) = 1 if the firm decides to plan about the aggregate state at date t, and dD
a
i (t) = 0
otherwise, and a process of planning dates Dzi (t) where dD
z
i (t) is defined in the same way, so as to
maximize its expected discounted profits6:
Ei0
{∫ ∞
0
Q(t)pii(t)dt− Fm
∫ ∞
0
Q(t)ω(t)dDai (t)− Fz
∫ ∞
0
Q(t)ω(t)dDzi (t)
}
taking as given {P (t), Q(t), ω(t), c(t)}∞t=0 and its information set at date 0. This Since,
Q(t)pii(t) =
e−ρt
λ
[(
RM(t)
P (t)
) 1
γ
−1(Pi(t)
P (t)
)1−
− α
[AZi(t)]
1
θ
(
RM(t)
P (t)
) 1
γθ
(
Pi(t)
P (t)
)− 
θ
]
the firm’s objective can be rewritten as
Ei0
{
1
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[(
RM(t)
P (t)
) 1
γ
−1(Pi(t)
P (t)
)1−
− α
[AZi(t)]
1
θ
(
RM(t)
P (t)
) 1
γθ
(
Pi(t)
P (t)
)− 
θ
]
dt
−α
[
Fm
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdDai (t)dt+ Fz
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdDzi (t)dt
]}
(13)
2.2.1 Costless Information
This is the case when Cm = Cz = 0. Thus, each firm updates its information set at each instant and
hence matches the target price exactly.
Proposition 1. In the Full Information case, prices track nominal money balances.
lnP fi (t) = ζ lnZi(t) + r lnP
f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t) (14)
where ζ = −1θ(1−)+ and r = 1− 1+γθ−θγ(θ(1−)+) and
lnP f (t) = lnM(t) (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus, under costless information processing, firms update their information set at each instant.
This results in prices reflecting up to date information about the aggregate and idiosyncratic state
at each instant. Thus, prices adjust proportionally to changes in money supple and so nominal
expenditure shocks do not affect real output even in the short run. This is the benchmark case in
which both the long and short run Phillips curves are perfectly vertical.
6When a firm i incurs the fixed cost to obtain information about the idiosyncratic state, it only receives information
pertaining to its own idiosyncratic shock, not about other firms. Since the idiosyncratic state for firm i follows an
independent Brownian motion, firm i’s best guess about other firms idiosyncratic shock is 0
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2.2.2 Costly Information
In the costly information case, Cm and Cz are positive. Since the firm faces a non-convex cost to
update its information set, it is natural to think of a solution to the firms decision as being one in
which the firm does not continuously update its information but does so only periodically. In fact,
the firms decision of whether to update or not can be seen as a threshold rule on the variance of the
forecasted loss from not updating its information about each of the states. I explain this in greater
detail later. The expected lifetime loss of the firm from not updating its information set at each instant
can be written as:
L = Ei0
{∫ ∞
0
Q(t)
[
pi(P fi (t);P (t),M(t), Zi(t))− pi(Pi(t);P (t),M(t), Zi(t))
]
dt
+Fm
∫ ∞
0
Q(t)ω(t)dDia(t) + Fz
∫ ∞
0
Q(t)ω(t)dDiz(t)
}
(16)
Maximizing the objective in equation (13) is equivalent to minimizing equation (16) as it is derived
by subtracting the objective from the flow of profits under full information which is a constant. It can
be shown that the second order Taylor approximation of the function above is:
L ≈ Ei0
{∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[lnPi(t)− lnP f (t)]2dt+ Cm
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdDai (t)dt+ Cz
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdDzi (t)dt
}
(17)
where Cm =
α(−1)Fm

[
θ−θ+
θ
]
and Cz =
α(−1)Fz

[
θ−θ+
θ
]
. Ck, k = m, z can be interpreted as the
cost in terms of labor of acquiring and processing information about the state k.
At anytime t, the economy has a cross sectional distribution of firms planning dates about the
aggregate state Γat (τa) and the idiosyncratic state Γ
z
t (τz). Γ
a
t (τa) ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of firms (at
time t) that acquired information about the aggregate state prior to date τa. Similarly, Γzt (τz) is the
fraction of firms that last acquired information about the idiosyncratic information prior to date τz.
dΓat (τ) and dΓ
z
t (τ) is the density of firms (at date t) that acquired information about the aggregate
state and the idiosyncratic state respectively exactly at date τ . In other words, the fraction 1−Γat (τa)
is the fraction of firms that know all the realizations of the aggregate state up to date τ : {qs}s≤τ
and 1− Γzt (τz) has the analogous interpretation for the idiosyncratic state7. The evolution of ΓKt (τ),
k = a, z can be written recursively as
Γkt+dt(τ) = Γ
k
t (τ)−
∫ τ
−∞
Pkt (s)dΓkt (s) ,∀t ≤ τ and k = a, z (18)
where Pkt (s) is the probability that a firm that acquired information about the aggregate (idiosyn-
cratic)state at date s will acquire information about the aggregate (idiosyncratic) state again at date t.
7As mentioned earlier firm i only finds out the realization of its own idiosyncratic shock.
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Solving the Model8
The firm’s decision depends on the entire lag of realizations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic state.
This means that the dimensionality of the firms problem is infinite dimensional. I use the method of
undetermined coefficients to find an analytical solution to the firms problem. This can be found in
Appendix A.3.
Define pi(t) = lnPi(t), p(t) = lnP (t), zi(t) = lnZi(t), m(t) = lnM(t) and p∗(t) = rp(t) + (1 −
r)m(t). Firm i that last planned at (τˆa, τˆz) will set price9
pi(t) = E{p∗(t) | Iτˆa}+ ζE{zi(t) | Iiτˆz} (19)
where Iτˆa = {m(s)}s≤τˆa and Iτˆa = {m(s)}s≤τˆa and Iiτˆz = {zi(s)}s≤τˆz .
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the following are true:
1. Aggregate (log) price p(t) follows the following process
p(t) = σm
∫ t
−∞
[1− Γat (τ)](1− r)
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) (20)
2.
p∗(t) = σq
∫ t
0
1− r
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) (21)
3.
E{p∗(t) | Iτˆm} = σq
∫ τˆm
0
1− r
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) (22)
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Thus, the evolution of the target price of firm i can be written as:
pfi (t) = σq
∫ t
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΓqt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζσz
∫ t
−∞
dBi(τ) (23)
For a firm that last planned about the aggregate state at τˆa and about the idiosyncratic state at τˆz,
the expected loss in profits from being imperfectly informed at date t can be written as
L(t, τˆm, τˆz) = E
{(
pi(t)− pfi (t)
)2 ∣∣Iτˆm , Iiτˆz} (24)
8For ease of exposition and solving the baseline model, I set µ = 0 and η = 0 for the rest of this section. I relax these
assumptions in Section 4.
9This is the expected value of the log of the full information price specified in equation (14) given the firms information
set.
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Such a firm would set a price pi(t) which satisfies equation (19)
pi(t) = E{pfi (t) | Iτˆm , Iiτˆz}
= σm
∫ τˆm
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζσz
∫ τˆz
−∞
dBi(τ) (25)
Also, pi(t)− pfi (t) can be written as
pi(t)− pfi (t) = σm
∫ t
τˆm
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζσz
∫ t
τˆz
dBi(τ)
Since the W (t) and Bi(t) are standard Brownian motion with unit variance, the expected instantaneous
loss from remaining uninformed can be written as
L(t, τˆm, τˆz) = σ2m
∫ t
τˆm
(
1− r
1− r + rΓqt (τ)
)2
dτ + ζ2σ2z
∫ t
τˆz
dτ ≡ L1(t, τˆq) + L2(t, τˆz)
Since the loss function is can be separated into a purely aggregate part and a purely idiosyncratic
part, the problem of the firm can be broken into two separate problems. This enables me to write
the choice of the planning horizon for acquiring information about the aggregate state and about the
idiosyncratic as two separate dynamic programs.
In such a setup, two structures of equilibria arise naturally: synchronized and staggered. The
synchronized equilibrium is one where all firms choose to update their information about state k,
k = m, z at the same date. The staggered equilibrium is one where all firms do not plan and change
prices at the same time. I solve for a stationary staggered equilibrium in which a fixed fraction of firms
plans about the aggregate and idiosyncratic state at each date. Lach and Tsiddon (1992) looking at
price distributions in Israel find that price changes are not synchronized. Thus, the more interesting
equilibrium structure is the staggered equilibrium and I focus on this in the paper.10I concentrate on
the pricing problem of firm i. Assume that all other firms acquire information about the aggregate
state every Tm periods and about their idiosyncratic state every Tz periods. Thus, the proportion of
firms acquiring information about the aggregate state over any interval is given 1Tmdt and about the
idiosyncratic state is 1Tz dt.As a result, in the staggered equilibrium
Γkt (τ) =
 0 if τ < t− Tk1− t−τTk if t− Tk < τ < t
for k = m, z.
A firm’s problem of choosing when to update its information set pertaining to the aggregate state,
given that it updated last at τˆm(today) can be written as
L1(τˆm) = min
τ ′m≥τˆm
∫ τ ′m
τˆm
e−ρ(s−τˆm)L1(s, τˆm)ds+ e−ρ(τ
′
m−τˆm)[Cm + L1(τ ′m)] (26)
10I discuss some aspects of the synchronized equilibrium in the next section
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where
L1(t, τˆ) =

σ2m
∫ t
τˆ
(1−r)2
(1−r (t−τ)
Tm
)2
dτ if τˆ ≥ t− Tm
σ2q
∫ t
t−Tm
(1−r)2
(1−r (t−τ)
t
)2
ds+ σ2q (t− Tm − τˆ) if τˆ < t− Tm
Similarly the problem to choose when to next plan for the idiosyncratic state given that the firm
planned today about the idiosyncratic state can be written as:
L2(τˆz) = min
τ ′z≥τˆz
∫ τ ′z
τˆz
e−ρ(s−τˆz)L2(s, τˆz)ds+ e−ρ(τ
′
z−τˆz)[Cz + L1(τ ′z)] (27)
L2(t, τˆ) = ζ2σ2z(t− τˆ)
Interpreting the decision problem of the firms as it is written above seems daunting but in fact the
solution is a simple threshold rule as discussed. σm
∫ t
τˆm
1−r
1−r+rΓmt (τ)dW (τ) is the error difference between
the the forecasted aggregate component of the target price pi(t) and the aggregate component of the
actual target price pf (t) given that forecasts are formed with respect to the information set Iτˆm .
Similarly ζσz
∫ t
τˆz
dBi(τ) is the error difference between the forecasted idiosyncratic component of the
target and the actual target price where the forecasts are made with respect to the information set
IIτˆz . Thus, the loss function can be seen as a variance of this error difference which grows linearly with
time in this basic case. Thus, the solution to the firms problem can be seen as a threshold for these
error variances. Once the error variance for state k state, k = m, z is reached, the firms chooses to
incur the fixed cost to update that part of its information set and resets the price error variance to
zero. It then makes forecasts on the basis of this newly expanded information set. Then it waits again
till the variance again grows large enough to warrant new information to sharpen its forecasts. The
threshold is chosen such that if the firm did not incur the fixed cost to update its information set, its
losses from a poorly forecasted target price would result in larger losses than incurring the cost and
reducing the forecast error.
The problem can be reformulated with the time since when last information was acquired. Define
δm = t − τˆm and δz = t − τˆz as the time since firm i last acquired information about the aggregate
state and about the idiosyncratic state respectively. Thus, the two Bellman equation above can be
rewritten as
L1(δm) = min
δ′m≥δm
∫ δ′m−δm
0
e−ρsL1(s)ds+ e−ρ(δ
′
m−δm)[Cq + L1(0)] (28)
L2(δz) = min
δ′z≥δz
∫ δ′z−δz
0
e−ρsL2(s)ds+ e−ρ(δ
′
z−δz)[Cz + L2(0)] (29)
where
L1(δm) =

σ2m
∫ δm
0
(1−r)2
(1−r s
Tm
)2
ds if δm ≤ Tm
σ2m
∫ T
0
(1−r)2
(1−r s
Tm
)2
ds+ σ2m(δm − Tm) if δm > Tm
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and
L2(δz) = ζ2σ2z
∫ δz
0
ds = ζ2σ2zδz
The solution to the first Bellman equation is characterized by the optimal planning horizon (for
aggregate money shocks) T ∗m, iff t > s+ T ∗m. Taking the first order with respect to δˆq for the problem
described in equation (28) and using the fact that the optimal horizon is T ∗m, we can write
L1(T ∗m) = ρ[Cq + L1(0)] (30)
where
L1(0) =
∫ T ∗m
0 e
−ρsL1(s)ds+ e−ρT
∗
mCm
1− e−ρT ∗m (31)
Proposition 3. Optimal Planning Horizon T ∗m
1. The optimal planning horizon for planning about the aggregate monetary shock, T ∗m is implicitly
defined by
Cm = σ2mT
∗
m
∫ T ∗m
0
(1− r)e−ρs T
∗
m − s
T ∗m − rs
ds (32)
2. and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Thus, each firm chooses to update its information set about the nominal demand shock every T ∗m
periods. Note that for Cm > 0, Tm = 0 does not solve the equation above and hence, it is never
optimal for a firm to update its information about the aggregate state at each instant unless doing so
is costless. Similarly for a finite Cm, T ∗m < ∞ and hence each firm will update its information set in
a finite amount of time and thus, all firms in the long run will incorporate all the information about
he monetary shock which leads to a vertical long run Phillips curve. Similarly, one can solve for the
unique optimal planning horizon for the idiosyncratic state T ∗z which is implicitly defined by
Cz = ζ2σ2z
∫ T ∗z
0
e−ρδ(T ∗z − δ)dδ (33)
As was argued above, for Cz ∈ (0,∞), T ∗z ∈ (0,∞), i.e., a firm will never find it optimal to update its
information about the idiosyncratic state to incorporate this into prices each instant. Neither will it
choose never to do so as long as the cost of doing so is positive and finite.
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3 Results and Discussion
Note that under the basic specification of the previous section firms change prices only when they
update their information even though there is no fixed cost attached to changing prices. With the
specification in the last section, a firm optimally chooses not to change prices if it is not “planning”.
This is because the firm’s expected target price does not change11 if it does not updating its information
set. Thus, the setup generates a firms behavior where they do not change prices in response to every
change in the state variable, in fact they change prices in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks at fixed and possibly different intervals.
A very interesting result that emerges from the analysis in the previous section is that even if the
cost of planning about the aggregate and idiosyncratic shock is the same, i.e. Cm = Cz and both
of them are equally volatile σm = σz, Tq 6= Tz in general. Thus, the model is capable of explaining
differential adjustment of prices in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The model presents
a scenario under which firms update their information about their idiosyncratic state more often than
about the aggregate state.
Proposition 4. T ∗m is increasing in the strength of the strategic complementarity which is measured
by r.
Proposition 5. For r ∈ (0, 1) and normalizing ζ = 1, if σm = σz = σ and Cm = Cz = C, then
Tm > Tz
Proposition 4 can be verified by applying shown using the Implicit function theorem on equation
(32). The only difference in the form of equations (32) and (33) (with ζ normalized to zero) is that
equation (33) is the same as equation (32) with r set to 0. Thus, from the previous proposition, it must
be that T ∗z > T ∗m. Proposition 5 implies that firms change prices in response to idiosyncratic shocks
much more often than in response to aggregate shocks. This feature of the model enables one to match
the facts from micro pricing data (prices change often) and also the evidence that the aggregate prices
move in a sluggish manner in response to monetary shocks. Reis (2007) uses a similar setup but, by not
incorporating the strategic complementarity in pricing and idiosyncratic shocks, cannot capture these
features. As opposed to earlier models, this paper can explain a differential frequency of price changes
to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The difference in this model which enables one to match this is
11This is because the stochastic processes for the money supply and idiosyncratic productivity shock are assumed to
follow Brownian motions with 0 drift in this section since µ = η = 0 in this section. This is not the case in the following
section. Since firms expected target price in general will not stay fixed over time, firms set price plans as will be shown
in the next section.
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the recognition of the fact strategic complementarity in pricing spills over into information acquisition
decisions about the aggregate state and causes a delay in information acquisition acquisition about
the aggregate state. This can be seen as a combination of two forces:
• When a firm gets new information about the aggregate state, it realizes that only a fraction of
firms are making their pricing decisions based on current information. All other firms are setting
prices based on old information and hence firms that get new information that warrants a large
price change under full information, in a setting of incomplete information temper their action
to account for all the firms which are making their decisions based on old information about the
aggregate state12, and
• The loss from being uninformed is increasing in the fraction of other firms that are informed. It
can be shown that
∂L1(t, τˆ)
∂(1− Γqt (τ))
> 0 ,∀τ ∈ (τˆ , t] iff r > 0
The staggered nature of information acquisition13 implies that the smaller fraction of firms is
much better informed than firm i. As a result, the firm is able to delay the decision to acquire
costly information about the aggregate state without losing too much profit.
Thus, even if planning about the aggregate and idiosyncratic states is equally costly and the two shocks
are equally volatile, firms will optimally choose to update their information about the idiosyncratic
12This is similar to the older literature on strategic complementarity such as Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985)
13The synchronized equilibrium also has similar properties. However, instead of a unique optimal planning horizon for
the monetary state, there exists a closed interval on the real line of optimal planning horizons, out of which anyone can
be the equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria is due to the complementarity r ∈ (0, 1]. The optimal planning horizon
for the idiosyncratic state remains unique as there is no complementarity associated with that aspect of pricing. For
more details on the multiplicity of equilibria, see Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009). In any case, it can be argued that the
optimal planning horizon for planning about the idiosyncratic case is still shorter than that for the aggregate state even
in the synchronized equilibria. Thus, the result still goes through. In a synchronized equilibrium, all firms adjust prices
simultaneously and hence when firms choose to update their information, prices reflect this information fully unlike in
the staggered equilibrium, where a prices only gradually adjust because firms who observe the new information have to
temper their response to it to account for those who have not acquired it yet. Thus, if there is a monetary policy shock
at a time between two planning dates, the output stays at the high level and does not decline till the next planning date
at which it then falls to the natural level as the aggregate price adjusts proportionally to the change in the monetary
policy. Thus, even in this setup, monetary policy is effective in the stimulating the economy in the short run but not in
the long run. However, the synchronized equilibria is not an interesting and realistic equilibrium as empirical evidence
rules out the existence of synchronized price changes. Thus, for the rest of the paper, I focus exclusively on the staggered
equilibrium.
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state more often than about the aggregate state and hence prices will incorporate new information
about the idiosyncratic at shorter intervals than about the aggregate state. This is because of the
beauty contest nature of the price setting problem. Firms want to set prices as close to the average
action and the true state. In setting price in response to aggregate shocks, the firm also has to
consider how other firms will respond to the aggregate shock and how that affects the average action.
This is because the same information about the monetary shock is observed by many firms and so
each firm not only has to set its price to incorporate this new information but also take care of how
other interpret this information and set prices. This is not the case when it comes to incorporating
information about their own idiosyncratic state. The firms price response to its own idiosyncratic
productivity shock is not influenced by the actions of others as each firm is small enough so that it
alone cannot affect the average price, but the price response to aggregate shocks depends on how other
respond to it as it affects the average action which each firm wants to track in addition to the true
state so that they do not set a price too high or too low compared to the average and hence either lose
a lot of demand or have too much demand so that it is forced to produce beyond the profit maximizing
level. Also, as explained earlier, the staggered nature of the equilibrium results in a large fraction of
firms being uninformed about the current true state. Thus, the firms that know the true state need to
temper their response to this new information. Thus, the immediate response to a monetary shock is
a less than proportional increase in prices whereas idiosyncratic shocks result in large changes. Figure
2 plots the response of aggregate price and real output to a positive monetary shock. Real output
increases at impact and then gradually decreases as more firms update their prices to incorporate the
shock to monetary policy into their prices. Once all firms update their information sets such that each
of them has incorporated the shock to monetary policy into their prices, the aggregate price adjusts
fully to the shock and output goes back to the natural level. Thus, the model displays a trade-off
between inflation and economic activity in the short run but no such trade-off in the long run and
hence generates a Phillips curve which is vertical in the long run but not so in the short run.
At the same time, the model is capable of matching both the large and frequent price changes seen
in micro data. The setup thus, offers a different result than Golosov and Lucas (2007) who find that
once they calibrate their model to micro pricing facts as in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), nominal
shocks do not have persistent effects. However, the current model is able to match the micro pricing
facts as well as providing for persistent effects of nominal shocks as in the standard time-dependent
pricing macro models ala Calvo (1983). This model can be seen as further micro-foundations of menu
cost models of pricing. If one looks at behavior of firms in this model; every time a firm incurs a fixed
cost, it changes price. This would be what would be seen in the data if the model is a menu-cost
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model. However, this model gives an interpretation of menu costs as managerial costs of planning
which have been found to be very important in a firms decision not to change prices often by Zbaracki
et al. (2004).
4 Extensions
4.1 Non Zero Long Inflation and Static Indexation
In this section, I talk about how this model is also consistent with other features of micro data.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find that the frequency of price increases co-varies strongly with
inflation but not price decreases. In the setup µ is the constant rate of long run wage inflation. In the
case with µ > 0,14 the price firm i sets at time t when it last updated its information sets at the dates
(τˆm, τˆz) can be seen as an appropriately altered version of equation (25):
pi(t) = E{pfi (t) | Iτˆm , Iiτˆz}
= σm
∫ τˆm
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + µt+ ζσz
∫ τˆz
−∞
dBi(τ)
In a setting with positive long run inflation, firms set a price schedule where prices are indexed to
the level of inflation. Thus, a higher level of average long run inflation results in prices increasing
by larger amounts as firms adjust for the higher rate of inflation. At the same time, the frequency
of updating information about the idiosyncratic state remains the same. As a result, the frequency
with which firms reduce price stays the same. At the same time, to adjust for higher inflation firms
increase prices each period by indexing prices to the long run rate of inflation. This is consistent with
the finding that prices increase more frequently than prices decrease when inflation is higher.
In such a setting, even though prices change all the time, prices only incorporate new information
at discrete intervals. Thus, rather than setting prices, firms are setting price schedules. Looking at the
previous section in this light, one realizes that firms were setting perfectly flat price schedules when
µ = 0. Now since inflation is a positive, firms set a price schedule where they index their prices to
long run inflation and at discrete intervals, update their information about the monetary state.
A large portion of the literature on the New Keynesian Phillips curve which make use of the
Calvo-Yun type sticky price setup assume that the non-adjusting firms index their prices to past lags
of inflation or average inflation. This helps the New Keynesian Phillips curve fit data better (Kryvtsov
and Kichian, 2008). The way this is often motivated is by imposing rule-of-thumb backward looking
behavior on the non-adjusting firms. This model gives micro foundations to such an assumption. IN
14Assuming that η = 0. This will be relaxed in subsequent paragraphs.
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the current setup, firms that do not update their information set about the aggregate state at time
t take into account the average long run level of inflation and set a price plan in which the prices
are indexed to this long run level of inflation. This inflation indexation is an attempt by the firm to
keep the forecast error to the minimum possible. Unlike in Section 3, here the firms forecast of the
target price is not constant over time because of the positive rate of inflation. Thus, unlike the last
section, firms here do not set flat price plans (unchanging prices). In fact firms set increasing price
plans, they raise prices every period by the level of long run average inflation. Even though prices are
indexed to long run inflation and hence change all the time, monetary policy is still effective in the
short run. This is because even though prices change often, new information is only incorporated into
prices gradually which implies that aggregate price still moves sluggishly in response to a monetary
policy shock.
4.2 Mean Reverting Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks
I now set µ = 0 again and instead set η > 0. This allows me to study price paths for firms in more
detail. Mankiw and Reis (2010) point out three features which are prominent when analyzing price
paths.
1. Prices change all the time, on average every three to four months.
2. Many of the price changes follow what seem like predetermined patterns that follow simple
algorithms and actual resetting of price plans based on new information seems less frequent.
3. There are many horizontal segments, reflecting short-lived intervals when nominal prices are
unchanged.
The current setup is consistent with all the above features. Evidence such as in Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are much more volatile and hence firms would tend to up-
date their information set about idiosyncratic shocks quite frequently and hence prices would change
frequently. The model can be calibrated to have prices change every 3-4 months. The present setup
is also capable of matching the second fact: generating price schedules that follow simple algorithms.
In such a setup, prices would change all the time but only incorporate new information at discrete
intervals. To look at such an equilibrium, set η > 0 in the basic model in section 3. Most of the
argument follows from before and it can be shown that firm i that last updated its information set at
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(τˆm, τˆz) will set a price15:
pi(t) = E{pfi (t) | Iτˆm , Iiτˆz}
= σm
∫ τˆm
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζzi(τˆz)e−η(t−τˆz) (34)
Thus,
pi(t)− pfi (t) = σm
∫ t
τˆm
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + ζ
[
zi(τˆz)e−η(t−τˆz) − zi(t)
]
and the loss function can be written as
L(t; τˆm, τˆz) = σ2m
∫ t
τˆm
(
1− r
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
)2
dτ + ζ2
σ2z
2η
(1− e−2η(t−τˆz))
As was the case before, the loss function can be separated into two parts, the first dealing solely
with the loss from being uninformed about the aggregate state and the second the loss from being
uninformed about the aggregate state. The optimal planning horizon T ∗∗m and T ∗∗z in this case can be
found the same way as in Section 3.
The solution to the optimal planning horizon regarding the aggregate state is still given by equation
(32). The solution to the planning horizon about the idiosyncratic state is given by
Cz =
ζ2σ2z
2η
∫ T ∗∗z
0
(e−ηδ − e−ηT ∗∗z )dδ
Assume that there are no monetary shocks. This allows a clearer exposition of what a price path
will look like. Suppose firm i plans about the idiosyncratic state today at t = t0 and observes that
z(t0) = z0 > 0. Then, it will choose to update its information set at t′ = t0 + T ∗∗z . In between t0 and
t0 + T ∗∗z , the firm changes prices so that
pi(t) = z0e−ηtfor t0 < t ≤ T ∗∗z
Thus, the firm sets a price plan according to which it reduces prices each period till t0 + T ∗∗z . At
t0 + T ∗∗z , the firm plans again and observes z(t0 + T ∗∗z ) = z1, sets price so that
p(t0 + T ∗∗z + dt) = z1e
−ηdt for dt < T ∗∗z
As was the case in Section 3, the firm’s decision of when to update their information set can be seen
as a threshold rule for the variance of the forecast error where the forecast is made conditional on the
information set of the firm at time t which is given by Iit = Iτm × Iiτz since the firm last updated
its information set regarding the aggregate state at taum and the idiosyncratic state at τz. Here the
15See Dixit and Pindyck (1993) for more on expectations and variances of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes.
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difference from Section 3 is that the error variance of the forecast for the idiosyncratic shock no longer
grows in a linear fashion over time. This is because the process for the idiosyncratic shock is no longer
described by a Brownian motion. With η > 0, the process defining the idiosyncratic productivity
shock is the mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. As Golosov and Lucas (2007) point out,
defining a stationary stochastic process for the idiosyncratic shock is essential if a model is to match
the features seen in actual data.
The firm sets simple pricing plans in periods it is not updating its information so as to track
the target price as closely as possible and the price jumps to a different plan every time the firm
plans again. Thus, in this setting, firms change prices all the time but only update their pricing plan
infrequently. This is consistent with the findings of Blinder et al. (1998) who find possible evidence
that managers were adjusting their price plans. In terms of the model the flat parts of the price path
could be those price plans which are chosen when at the planning date the level of z(t0) = 0; then the
price plan is just not to change prices till the next time the firm plans. These can be frequent events if
the volatility of the productivity shocks σ2z is low or if the tendency to be around the mean is high (high
η). Thus, this model is capable of all the notable features of data which are highlighted by Mankiw and
Reis (2010). Figure 1 plots an example of a price path in response only to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. The bottom panel of the figure plots the inverse of the realization of the idiosyncratic shock.
This is done to make the two panels respond in the same direction. A higher idiosyncratic productivity
shock would reduce the marginal cost and hence lower price while an adverse productivity shock will
warrant a rise in prices. For the particular parametrization used, the firm plans every 10th week
and sets a price plan for the next 10 weeks. The triangles in the figure mark the dates at which the
firm updates its information set about the idiosyncratic state. Notice that the triangles correspond
to discrete jumps in the price. These discrete jumps in price are indicative of new information being
incorporated into prices. Even though prices are changing between successive triangles, they do not
contain any new information compared to when the pricing plan was set. There are dips in prices and
then prices gradually go up. These episodes could be interpreted as sales episodes which are observed
in the data16. Also, there is an extended period where prices do not change at all, for example the
duration between weeks 25 and 32.
16This model in the current form is maybe too simplistic to analyze sales but this could be a possible direction to
extend the model in.
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ﬁrm updates its information set about the idiosyncratic state. Notice that the triangles correspond
to discrete jumps in the price. These discrete jumps in price are indicative of new information being
incorporated into prices. Even though prices are changing between successive triangles, they do not
contain any new information compared to when the pricing plan was set. There are dips in prices and
then prices gradually go up. These episodes could be interpreted as sales episodes which are observed
in the data16. Also, there is an extended period where prices do not change at all, for example the
duration between weeks 25 and 32.
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Figure 2: Price path of ﬁrm i in response to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
16This model in the current form is maybe too simplistic to analyze sales but this could be a possible direction to
extend the model in.
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Figure 1: Price path of firm i in response to idiosyncratic productivity shocks
4.3 Comparison with Rational Inattention models
The predictions of this model are slightly different from the models which rely on rational inattention to
generate sticky prices. In Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), for example, firms allocate their limited
information processing capacity more towards the more volatile idiosyncratic shocks and this leads
to the price not containing all the information about the aggregate state leading to non-neutralities.
However, firms are never allowed to observe past realizations of aggregate price which is generated as
an equilibrium outcome in the model and thus is a signal of the monetary shock in the last period
with a finite variance which is also an equilibrium object. Thus, this can be seen as a free signal
which makes the estimate of the current state of monetary policy more certain in conjunction with
the signal that firms draw about todays monetary policy. For a certain set of parameters, in the case
aggregate price is not too noisy a signal, this might mean that the posterior distribution of the firms
estimate of monetary policy today might become precise enough and prices might hence react more
to the aggregate shock, reducing the degree of non-neutrality. Not allowing firms to observe the past
realizations of aggregate price, seems to be a very strong and unrealistic assumption. This problem
arises technically because the choice of information is a continuous choice in these models. In models
where information choice is discrete like in models of inattentiveness, this is not a problem. Here firms
are allowed to observe all realizations of the past shocks once they incur a fixed cost. This leads to
very different implications about the long run Phillips curve in both these setups.
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Setups like the one in the current paper, in which the choice of precision is not continuous and
firms can either choose zero or infinite precision result in prices which are informationally inefficient
in the long run but not in the short run. However, models with continuous choice of precision, by
virtue for firms having a finite processing capacity which is only allocated to the realizations today,
results in cases in which prices are not informationally efficient even in the long run and hence their
contract multiplier is potentially infinite. The clearest example to see this is when there is a one time
permanent positive monetary shock. In setups which use inattentiveness types of information choice,
after a large number of periods (finite) after the shock has occurred, since all firms will have incurred
a cost to observe all past realizations of the shock, they know about the shock and hence prices will
respond one for one and hence the permanent monetary shock is neutral in the long run, even though
it may not be so in the short run because only a fraction of firms knows about the shock in the
short run. However, in the rational inattention models, this is not the case. Since firms are limited
to obtaining signals about only todays aggregate state, they cannot make use of the the free signals
which they potentially can observe in the form of past aggregate prices. Since the firms have limited
information processing capacity, they will hence never find out the true realization of monetary policy
and hence the aggregate price will never catch up with the permanent monetary shock and hence the
non-neutrality still persists in the long run.
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Figure 1: Response of aggregate price and real output to a monetary shock
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Figure 2: Response of aggregate price and real output to a monetary shock
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5 Calibration
Like many other papers in the New Keynesian literature, I simulate the model around a zero long run
inflation steady state. As a result µ = 0. I draw on existing literature for the values of the preference
parameters ρ, γ, α, and . The annual discount rate ρ = 0.04, following an annual calibration. The risk
aversion parameter is set to γ = 2. The elasticity of substitution parameter  = 7. The dis-utility of
labor α = 6. The exponent on labor in the production function is calibrated to the standard value of
θ = 23 . This calibration yields r = 0.72. This measures the strength of the strategic complementarity
in price setting. Woodford (2003) suggests values of r between 0.75 and 0.9. Since the planning horizon
about the aggregate state is an increasing function of the strength of the strategic complementarity,
this is a conservative estimate and even below the lower bound suggested in Woodford (2003) and
thus, does not inflate the importance of the non-neutrality, in fact it imparts a downward bias.
The specification of the shock processes for the monetary and the idiosyncratic productivity shocks
are very similar to the calibration used in Golosov and Lucas (2007). In the basic setup, I set η =
0, which makes the idiosyncratic productivity a random walk. As in Golosov and Lucas (2007), I
use, σm = 0.0062 which corresponds to the standard deviation of quarterly inflation in the Klenow-
Kryvtsov data set. In the case with η = 0 and without monetary shocks, firms set price plans to
track their idiosyncratic productivity shocks and as mentioned in Section 2.2.2, these price plans take
the form of unchanging prices till the next review. Golosov and Lucas (2007) have a mean reverting
idiosyncratic productivity shock with the variance 0.011. To translate that variance into a variance for
the random walk shock that the idiosyncratic shock follows in this calibration with η = 0, I calculate
the unconditional variance of their idiosyncratic shock and use that as the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock in the current setup. This yields a variance of the idiosyncratic shock of σ2z = 0.0137931.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) document that median price change occurs every T ∗z = 0.299 years
(or at a frequency slightly greater than a quarter). I make use of this prediction and calibrate Cz so
that the price of an average firm changes every T ∗z = 0.299 years, i.e. each firm chooses to update its
information set about its idiosyncratic state every T ∗z = 0.299 years. Without any strong reason to
believe that the cost of acquiring information about the aggregate state should be less than or greater
than the cost of acquiring information about the idiosyncratic state, I set Cm = Cz. The calibrated
value of this cost is 3.83817 × 10−5. Under the same calibration, Golosov and Lucas (2007) use a
menu cost k = 2.5 × 10−3 which is roughly 0.5 percent of the revenues of the firm. Thus, under the
same calibration, the cost of acquiring and processing information is even smaller than 0.5 percent of
revenue.
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Using this value for Cm = Cz, I use equation (32) to calculate the optimal planning horizon about
the aggregate state T ∗m = 3.09 years or 12.36 quarters. This implies that a shock to monetary policy
will have an effect on real output till 3.09 years later. After 6.3 quarters, the aggregate price has only
responded by half of its long run reaction. The path of aggregate price can be seen in Figure (2. Thus,
for larger values of r in the interval [0.75, 0.9], the effect of a monetary policy shock on output lasts
for longer than 3.09 years under this calibration.
6 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper is one of the few papers which can reconcile the seemingly con-
tradictory macro and micro level pricing evidence. The model predicts the presence of a trade-off
between inflation and output in the short run but not in the long run, hence it predicts a perfectly
vertical Long Run Phillips Curve but not short run Phillips curve which is not perfectly vertical. To
the extent of my knowledge, this is one of the few papers which tries to model the frequency of price
changes endogenously. The model is consistent with evidence from various studies. By allowing for
frequently changing and volatile prices it matches micro-pricing evidence presented in Bils and Klenow
(2004) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and at the same time predicts a sluggish response of aggre-
gate price to nominal shocks, hence allowing for real effects of nominal shocks in the short run. This
model is capable of explaining both the differential adjustment of prices (both in terms of frequency
of price change and magnitude) in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Earlier literature
such as the sticky information literature was unable to explain this differential adjustment. Mackowiak
and Wiederholt (2009) explained the differential adjustment in magnitude but the frequency of price
changes is not modeled in their setup. By incorporating continuous time, I find it easier to model the
frequency aspect of price changes and show that the strategic complementarity in pricing decisions
combined with endogenous information acquisition decisions results in complementarity associated
with planning about the aggregate state and this causes a firm to delay the decision to acquire infor-
mation about the aggregate state and hence, aggregate price is based on old information for a longer
time and this manifests itself as sluggish response of aggregate price to monetary shocks.
This paper is also capable of matching some important regularities seen in price data as laid out
in Mankiw and Reis (2010). The paper is also consistent to a certain extent with studies such as
Blinder et al. (1998) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) who used interviews with firm managers to determine
what the reasons were for firms pricing behavior. As mentioned before, Blinder et al. (1998) find
evidence that suggests that managers set price plans rather than attempt to determine the optimal
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price at each instant. This is consistent with the model as it shows that firm’s optimally choose to
update their information at discrete intervals and in the mean time set prices according to some price
schedule which may or may not be a constant price. The fact that firms only plan periodically and
so prices incorporate new information only periodically is supported by the findings of both Blinder
et al. (1998) and Zbaracki et al. (2004). The fact that the model is able to match these additional
features, which was not the main aim of the paper, suggests that the setup is robust.
The model can be thought of as a micro foundations to the menu costs model. In the model firms
incur a fixed cost every time they try to incorporate new information into prices. Unlike standard
menu models such as Golosov and Lucas (2007) who find that on calibrating these menu cost models
to match the micro pricing facts, these models predict a small and transitory response to monetary
shocks. The current model by virtue of being able to match micro-level pricing facts and at the same
time generating sluggish response of aggregate prices to nominal shocks, seems to suggest that the
current state dependent models might be looking at the wrong place for costs of changing prices. This
finding is consistent with that of Zbaracki et al. (2004) who find that costs associated with acquiring
and processing information are much more important than purely physical costs of changing prices in
determining the frequency of price changes.
The paper also provides micro-foundations for the commonly made methodological assumption in
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve literature, where in a Calvo-Yun type of sticky price environment,
non-adjusting firms are assigned rule of thumb behavior according to which they index their prices to
lagged or average inflation. I show that in a setting with positive long run average inflation, firms on
dates in which they do not update their information sets about the monetary state, optimally choose
to index their price to the long run inflation level. This results in firms setting increasing price plans
over time.
The paper suggests that nominal rigidities are important in explaining the short run Phillips curve
trade-off. Unlike the standard models used in macroeconomics, the current paper looks to explain
the existence of nominal rigidities as arising out of costly information acquisition and processing.
This setup by virtue of being consistent with both micro-pricing facts and the macro literature on
sluggish adjustment of prices to monetary shocks, appears to be a better description of the firms price
setting problem than the popular time-dependent or state-dependent menu-cost models which rely
on the physical costs of changing prices to generate these rigidities. Also, the paper presents a novel
result that even with an extremely small cost of processing information, non neutralities can have
extended effects. Also, an important point that the paper makes is that prices don’t need to be sticky
in the traditional sense of not changing; rather prices can change all the time but they need to be
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informationally inefficient, i.e. prices should not aggregate information efficiently in the short run.
This, informational inefficiency of prices in the short run leads to a non-vertical short run Phillips
curve and thus implies a trade off between inflation and economics activity in the short run. The
model also points to the fact that simply observing changing prices does not automatically imply
non-neutrality, prices may change and yet may not incorporate any informational content about the
innovation to the current monetary policy, and hence can still imply non-neutrality.
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A Appendix: Proofs
This section contains proofs of the propositions in the main text.
A.1 Existence of a constant equilibrium nominal interest rate
By definition
Q(t) = eR(t)dtEt{Q(t+ dt)}
From equation (6):
Et
(
Q(t+ dt)
Q(t)
)
= e−ρdtEt
(
R(t)MD(t)
R(t+ dt)MD(t+ dt)
)
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Impose R(t) = R(t+ dt) = R:
Et
(
Q(t+ dt)
Q(t)
)
= e−ρdtEt
(
MD(t)
MD(t+ dt)
)
= e
(
−ρ−µ+σ
2
m
2
)
dt
Thus,
R = ρ+ µ− σ
2
m
2
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The Full-Information case is when Fm = Fz = 0. All firms adjust prices in response to all shocks at
every instant. Each firm sets Pi(t) so as to maximize (13):
P fi (t) =
[
α
θ(− 1)
R
1+θγ−θ
γθ
A
1
θ
] θ
θ(1−)+
Zi(t)
− 1
θ(1−)+M(t)
1+γθ−θ
γ(θ(1−)+)P (t)1−
1+γθ−θ
γ(θ(1−)+)
Define A =
[
α
θ(−1)R
1+γθ−θ
γθ
]θ
so that the initial constant term goes to 1. Thus,
P fi (t) = Zi(t)
− 1
θ(1−)+M(t)
1+γθ−θ
γ(θ(1−)+)P (t)1−
1+γθ−θ
γ(θ(1−)+)
Taking logs on both sides
lnP fi (t) = ζ lnZi(t) + r lnP
f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t)
where ζ = −1θ(1−)+ and r = 1− 1+γθ−θγ(θ(1−)+) .
The price index defined in equation (10) can be approximated by
lnP (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnPi(t)di
and so integrating equation (14) over i ∈ [0, 1] yields:
lnP f (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnP fi (t)di = ζ
∫ 1
0
lnZi(t)di+ r lnP f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t)
= r lnP f (t) + (1− r) lnM(t)
= lnM(t)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Guess that p(t) follows the path
p(t) = σm
∫ t
−∞
gt(τ)dW (τ) + ht(τ)t
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Plugging this guess into the expression for p∗(t) yields
p∗(t) = σm
∫ t
−∞
[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
Note that
E{p∗(t) | Iτˆa} = σm
∫ τˆa
−∞
[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
and
E{zi(t) | Iiτˆz} = σz
∫ τˆz
−∞
dBi(τ)
Thus, from equation (19), firm i with the information set Iit = Iτˆa × Iiτˆz is
pi(t) = σm
∫ τˆm
−∞
[1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t+ ζσz
∫ τˆz
−∞
dBi(τ)
The aggregate (log) price can be derived by integrating over the two distributions Γmt and Γ
z
t .
p(t) = σq
∫ t
−∞
[1− Γmt (τ)][1− r + rgt(τ)]dW (τ) + (1− r)µt+ rht(τ)t
Using the method of undetermined coefficients yields
gt(τ) =
[1− Γat (τ)](1− r)
1− r + rΓat (τ)
and ht(τ) = µ
Thus,
p(t) =
∫ t
−∞
(1− r)(1− Γmt (τ))
1− r + rΓmt (τ)
dW (τ) + µt
Plugging this into the expression for
p∗(t) = rσm
∫ t
−∞
([1− Γat (τ)]1− r)
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) + rµt+ (1− r)σm
∫ t
−∞
dW (τ) + (1− r)µt
= σm
∫ t
−∞
1− r
1− r + rΓat (τ)
dW (τ) + µt
The next claim follows from the fact that W (t) is a standard Brownian motion.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Following equations (30) and (31), in equilibrium since Tm = T ∗m, it must be the case that
L1(T ∗m) =
ρ
1− e−ρT ∗m
(∫ T ∗m
0
e−ρsL1(s)ds+ Cm
)
or
Cm =
∫ T ∗m
0
e−ρδ[L1(T ∗m)− L1(δ)]dδ
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Recall that
L1(δ) = σ2m
∫ δ
0
(1− r)2(
1− r sTm
)2ds
if δ ≤ Tm. Define Θ = sT ∗m , L1(δ) can be written as
L1(δ) = σ2mT
∗
m
∫ δ/T ∗m
0
(
1− r
1− rΘ
)2
dΘ = σ2m(1− r)2T ∗m
δ
T ∗m − rδ
which can be used to write
L1(T ∗m)− L1(δ) = (1− r)T ∗m
T ∗m − δ
T ∗m − rδ
Therefore, T ∗m is implicitly defined by
Fm(σm, r, Cm, T ∗m) = 0
where
Fm(σm, r, Cm, Tm) = Cm − σ2mTm
∫ Tm
0
(1− r)e−ρs Tm − s
Tm − rsds
Note that
∂Fm
∂T ∗m
= −σ2m(1− r)
∫ T ∗m
0
T ∗m − s
T ∗m − rs
ds− σ2m(1− r)T ∗m
∫ T ∗m
0
s(1− r)
(T ∗m − rs)2
ds < 0 for 0 < r < 1
Since, Fm(σm, r, Cm, 0) = Cm > 0 and ∂Fm∂T ∗m < 0, Fm crosses zero only once, T
∗
m > 0 is unique.
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